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We have been loathe to coerce involuntary servitude in all walks of
life; we do not forcibly take any property without just compensation;
we do not mandate acts of charity. We believe that a person's
voluntary service to others has to come from within the soul of that
person. Our canons in this area are designed to be directory, to
enlighten one's conscience, to focus attention on what is right for
lawyers to do, but, historically, have not been meant to force an
involuntary act.I
I. INTRODUCTION
F EW recent issues have been more passionately debated by mem-
bers of the Florida Bar, or by the members of the legal profession
nationwide, than that of uncompensated legal services for the benefit
of indigent civil litigants.2 This debate has generated a myriad of law
review articles, lectures, and commentaries by many well-recognized
and respected legal scholars. Almost invariably, however, the only
source of agreement in this debate is that the legal needs of the poor
are not being met.'
1. In re Emergency Delivery of Legal Services to the Poor, 432 So. 2d 39, 41 (Fla. 1983)
(footnote omitted) (representing the Florida Supreme Court's position when last asked to adopt
a mandatory pro bono plan).
2. Donating Legal Services to Poor Splits Lawyers, MIA HERALD, Nov. 14, 1982, at Dl.
3. Chesterfield H. Smith, A Mandatory Pro Bono Service Standard-Its Time Has Come,
772 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 22:771
The debate reached the steps of the Supreme Court of Florida dur-
ing the latter half of 1989 when fifty-eight members of the Florida Bar
petitioned the court to amend the Rules Regulating the Florida Bar -
1-3.1(a) and Rules of Judicial Administration - 2.065, (Amendments
1).4 The determinations of the court in Amendments I set the tone for
the court's subsequent decision to call for an amendment to the Rules
Regulating the Florida Bar slightly more than one year later, (A mend-
ments II).5 Amendments H called for the creation of a Florida Bar
rule specifically defining a voluntary pro bono scheme with a manda-
tory recording provision.6 The rule proposed by the Florida Bar was
submitted for approval to the Florida Supreme Court in 1993,
(Amendments to Rules).7 The court in Amendments to Rules agreed
to place into effect Rule 4-6.1, Florida Rules of Professional Conduct,
entitled "Pro Bono Public Service." ' Rule 4-6.1 established, as re-
quested by the court in Amendments 11,9 a voluntary pro bono pro-
35 U. MIMti L. REv. 727 (1981) (stating that the legal needs of the poor remain unmet and
proposing a mandatory pro bono program in Florida); Cynthia R. Watkins, In Support of a
Mandatory Pro Bono Rule for New York State, 57 BRooK. L. REv. 177 (1991) (arguing for a
mandatory pro bono rule); Greg Stevens, Forcing Attorneys to Represent Indigent Civil Liti-
gants: The Problems and Some Proposals, 18 U. MicH. J.L. REF. 767 (1985) (suggesting that
although the legal needs of indigent litigants are not being met, mandatory pro bono is not the
answer); Suzanne Bretz, Why Mandatory Pro Bono is a Bad Idea, 3 GEO. J. LEGAL Ersucs 623
(1990) (arguing against mandatory pro bono despite the fact that the availability of legal services
to the poor has substantially decreased); At Issue: Mandatory Pro Bono, 74 A.B.A. J. 46 (May
1, 1988) (agreeing on the crucial need for pro bono, Alexander Forger, former president of New
York's Legal Aid Society and Esther Lardent, a pro bono specialist, disagree on the most effec-
tive tactics).
4. In re Amendments to Rules Regulating the Florida Bar- l-3.1(a) and Rules of Judicial
Administration-2.065 (Legal Aid), 573 So. 2d 800 (Fla. 1990) [hereinafter Amendments I1.
5. In re Amendments to Rules Regulating the Florida Bar-l-3.1(a) and Rules of Judicial
Administration-2.065 (Legal Aid), 598 So. 2d 41 (Fla. 1992) [hereinafter Amendments 11.
6. Id. at 44. As of October 1, 1993, Florida Bar members were required to report whether
they met their professional obligation to provide pro bono legal services by filling out one of the
following categories located on the lower right hand corner of their annual dues statement:
(1) I have personally provided hours of pro bono legal services;
(2) 1 have provided pro bono legal services collectively by:(indicate type of case and
manner in which service was provided);
(3) I have contributed $_ to:(indicate organization to which funds were provided);
(4) 1 have provided legal services to the poor in the following special manner:(indicate
manner in which services were provided); or
(5) 1 have been unable to provide pro bono legal services to the poor this year
(6) I am deferred from the provision of pro bono legal services to the poor because I
am:(indicate whether lawyer is a member of the judiciary or judicial staff; a govern-
ment lawyer prohibited by statute, rule or regulation from providing services; retired;
or inactive).
7. Amendments to Rules Regulating the Florida Bar-l.3.1(a) and Rules of Judicial Ad-
ministration-2.065 (Legal Aid), 630 So. 2d 501 (Fla. 1993) [hereinafter Amendments to Rules].
8. Id. at 507.
9. Amendments 1I, supra note 5, at 44.
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gram with a reporting requirement.' 0 Moreover, the court in
Amendments to Rules," as well as in the text of Rule 4-6.1,11 sug-
gested that failure to comply with the reporting requirement will result
in disciplinary sanctions.' 3
The purpose of this Comment is threefold: first, it will expose the
toothless nature of Florida's comprehensive voluntary pro bono pro-
gram;'4 second, it will examine the nonfeasibility and inherent unfair-
ness of mandatory pro bono service; and third, this Comment will
offer some efficient and practical alternatives to solve the underlying
dilemma of ensuring access to the civil justice system for all segments
of society. This Comment will not, however, address the constitu-
tional questions involved in mandatory pro bono service. Persuasive
constitutional arguments have been advanced from both sides of the
debate 5 with no significant consensus.' 6 Moreover, the U.S. Supreme
Court has not provided any guidance on the matter, as is evidenced by
its failure to directly address the constitutionality of gratuitous civil
representation of the poor in Mallard v. United States District
Court. 7
10. Amendments to Rules, supra note 7, at 507-08.
I1. Id. at 505.
12. FLA. BAR R. PROF. CONDUCT 4-6.1(d).
13. Florida is the first state to require reporting of pro bono hours by lawyers. Alice
Hughey, Florida Approves New Pro Bono Rules, ABA CENrR FOR PRO BoNo ExcHArt, 6
(Oct. 1993). But see Gary Blankenship, Pro Bono Plan Challenged in Federal Court, FLA. B.
NEws, Aug. 1, 1994, at 1. The constitutionality of Florida's reporting scheme has recently been
challenged in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida by a Florida Bar mem-
ber. The lawsuit, against Chief Justice Stephen R. Grimes in his capacity as chief administrative
officer of the Supreme Court of Florida, seeks to have the imposition of disciplinary sanctions
for nonreporting dropped from Rule 4-6.1 because it subjects attorneys who don't perform
enough service hours to public and professional ridicule. Id.
14. Brief for Respondent Harry Trawick at 8, Amendments II, supra note 5, at 41 (No.
74538) (criticizing Florida's voluntary pro bono program as being no more than "a rallying cry
for the status quo").
15. Bruce A. Green, Court Appointment of Attorneys in Civil Cases: The Constitutionality
of Uncompensated Legal Assistance, 81 COLUM. L. REv. 366 (1981) (concluding that there is no
constitutional bar against being required to provide uncompensated legal assistance to indigent
litigants). But see David L. Shapiro, The Enigma of the Lawyer's Duty to Serve, 55 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 735, 762-77 (1980) (suggesting numerous constitutional weaknesses with uncompensated
legal representation).
16. Shapiro, supra note 15, at 777 (after a thorough discussion of the constitutionality of
compulsory legal services, Shapiro concludes that none of the constitutional questions surround-
ing uncompensated legal services are easily resolved).
17. 490 U.S. 296 (1989). The Court's holding that an unwilling attorney cannot be required
by a federal court to represent an indigent litigant was based on the Court's interpretation of
Congress' intent in promulgating 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d), which allows federal courts to "request"
an attorney to represent any person claiming in forma pauperis status. The Court never took up
the constitutionality question. Id.
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II. AMENDMENTS I AND H, AND RULE 4-6.1
In December 1990, Justice Overton, writing for the majority of the
Supreme Court of Florida in Amendments I, found that lawyers had
an obligation, upon admission to the Florida Bar, to render legal serv-
ices to the poor when appointed by the court."5 His opinion disre-
garded the United States Supreme Court holding in Mallard v. United
States District Court which expressly disallowed uncompensated legal
services when justified solely in terms of a lawyer's traditional profes-
sional obligation. 19 Instead, the court relied on its own precedent in In
re D.B.20 to support its assertion that there exists an historic profes-
sional obligation on the legal profession to represent the poor.21 The
majority quickly recognized, however, that no change to the Rules
Regulating the Florida Bar was warranted at that time; rather, the
court requested recommendations from the Florida Bar Joint Access
Commission on how to improve and expand the delivery of legal serv-
iceg to the poor.2"
The Joint Access Commission filed its report with the Supreme
Court of Florida on March 21, 1991,2 concluding that only about
one-fifth of the legal needs of the poor were being fulfilled. 4 Recom-
mendation 24 of the Commission, entitled "Voluntary Pro Bono Le-
gal Services," called for either an annual minimum of twenty hours of
voluntary pro bono legal services to the poor or a monetary contribu-
tion crf $350 to a legal aid organization. This became the focus of the
court's discussion in Amendments I,26 where the majority accepted
this proposal over an original request of petitioners for a minimum of
fifty hours and a monetary contribution computed at the rate of thirty
dollars per hour for all pro bono hours not performed.27 In Amend-
ments II, the court changed its justification for advocating uncompen-
sated legal services to the poor by members of the Florida Bar.
Instead of dwelling on the historic role and obligation of lawyers to
18. Amendments I, supra note 4, at 801.
19. 490U.S. at 310.
20. In re D.B., 385 So. 2d 83 (Fla. 1980).
21. Amendments I, supra note 4, at 803 (citing Rules Relating to Ethics Governing Bench
and Bar, 145 Fla. 763, 797 (1941)). A portion of the oath to practice states, "I will never reject,
from any consideration personal to myself, the cause of the defenseless or oppressed..." Id. at
119.
22. Id. at 806.
23. REPORT OF THE FLORIDA BAR/FLoRmA BAR FOUNDATION JOINT COMMISSION ON THE DE-
LIVERY OF LEo.M SERVICES TO THE INmDIENT IN FLORIDA (Mar. 21, 1991).
24. Amendments 11, supra note 5, at 41.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 42.
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represent indigent civil litigants, the court reasoned that members of
the legal profession have a duty to provide gratuitous representation
to the poor as a means of ensuring proper challenges against govern-
ment violations of individual rights.28
The court's holding in Amendments II and the ruling in Amend-
ments to Rules culminated in the establishment of Rule 4-6.1, Florida
Rules of Professional Conduct.29 That rule contains an aspirational
provision which suggests that members of the Florida Bar should, as a
matter of professional responsibility, render pro bono legal services to
the poor. 30 Rule 4-6.1 calls for the discharge of this responsibility by
completing twenty hours of legal services to the poor each year, or by
donating $350 to a legal aid organization." Members of law firms can
also participate in a collective satisfaction plan, whereby all members
of the firm can discharge their pro bono responsibility if one or more
members perform pro bono representation which requires substantial
time, effort, and expense. 32 Most importantly, under Rule 4-6.1 each
member of the Bar must report whether or not she satisfied her pro-
fessional responsibility, or be subject to disciplinary action. 3
The court in Amendments to Rules stated explicitly that Rule 4-6.1
should be understood to be "aspirational rather than mandatory in
nature. ' 34 This holding substantially diminished the high expectations
accompanying the promulgation of Rule 4-6.1; indeed, it did nothing
more than announce to the general public that Florida lawyers must
be reminded, like small children required to perform household
chores, of their responsibility to provide legal services without com-
pensation to those in the lower economic strata of society.
III. THE METAMORPHOSIS: VOLUNTARY TO MANDATORY PRO BONO
One of the respondents' many briefs in Amendments II character-
ized the Petitioners' objective to amend the Florida Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct as "one of a long line of projects purported to
improve the reputation of the Bar among the members of the public
by pandering to the press and hoping for favorable publicity." 3" This
28. Id. at 43.
29. FLA. BAR R. PROF. CONDUCT 4-6.1.
30. Id. Rule 4-6.1(a).
31. Id. Rule 4-6.1(b).
32. Id. Rule 4-6.1(c).
33. Id. Rule 4-6.1(d). This section does not specify what sort of disciplinary action will be
taken under the plan. Failure to comply with the recording requirement could mean anything
from receiving a formal reprimand to disbarment; see also supra note 6 and infra note 55 and
accompanying text.
34. Amendments to Rules, supra note 7, at 508 (emphasis in original).
35. Brief of Respondent Henry Trawick, Jr. at 7, Amendments II, supra note 5, at 41.
19951
776 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 22:771
was likely the case in light of the statewide negative publicity follow-
ing the Supreme Court of Florida holdings in Delivery of Emergency
Services to the Poor, Furman I, and Furman J116 Lawyers and judges
alike were scolded by the press for a lack of sensitivity toward those in
society who cannot afford the often prohibitive prices of formal legal
representation. 7 The reputation of the legal profession suffered blow
after blow, and with it, public trust in the profession floundered.,8
This public relations disaster was magnified by figures which show
that only about fifteen percent of licensed attorneys nationwide par-
ticipate in formal pro bono programs. 39 Those favoring pro bono re-
form saw a situation ripe for change. Change came in the form of a
pronouncement from the Supreme Court of Florida to the members
of the Florida Bar, reminding them of their aspirational professional
obligation, and forcing them to live up to this obligation through a
reporting requirement.40
Talbot "Sandy" D'Alemberte, a major proponent of the pro bono
movement in Florida and the attorney who argued the petitioner's
case before the Supreme Court of Florida in Amendments I and
Amendments II, made a remarkably revealing statement about the fu-
ture of pro bono in Florida when he said "the general tendency has
been to give voluntary pro bono programs a fair chance to succeed
before resorting to mandatory requirements."14' While this may be
viewed as an optimistic statement about the current voluntary pro-
gram in Florida, it may also be seen as an indication that Florida will
soon see yet another push42 for mandatory pro bono given the proba-
36. Put More Pro in Pro Bono, MIAMI HERALD, Feb. 6, 1983, at E2; Mandatory Pro Bono
is Not for the Public Good, TALLAHASSEE DEMOCRAT, Jan. 9, 1983, at B2; Challenge for State's
Lawyers, FLA. JACKSONVLLE Tmns-UNIoN, May 24, 1983, at AI0; Justice is a Warm Glow,
GAunsvna SuN, May 23, 1983, at A4.
The Florida Bar v. Furman, 376 So. 2d 378 (Fla. 1979) (enjoining legal secretary Rosemary
Furman from preparing documents needed for dissolution of marriage) (Furman I); The Florida
Bar v. Furman, 451 So. 2d 808 (Fla. 1984) (approving 90-day jail sentence for Furman who
violated 1979 injunction) (Furman II); In re Emergency Delivery of Emergency Services to the
Poor, 432 So. 2d 39 (Fla. 1983).
37. Poor Justice, MIAI HERALD, May 23, 1983, at A12.
38. Alan Slobodin, Pro Bono Should Be Free Choice, NAT'L. L.J., May 25, 1992, at 13
(reporting that a May 1991 Gallup Poll asking Americans to rank occupations according to hon-
esty and integrity ranked lawyers behind most occupations and only slightly ahead of prostitutes
and congressmen).
39. Kim Schimenti, Pro Choice for Lawyers in a Revised Pro Bono System, 23 SEToN HALL
L. REv. 641, 674 n.153 (1993).
40. Amendments 11, supra note 5 at 41.
41. Talbot "Sandy" D'Alemberte, Lawyers Have a Duty to Serve the Poor and Judges
Have a Duty to See that They Do, 31 JuDoas' J. 20, 21 (1992); Talbot "Sandy" D'Alemberte,
Trial Balloon: Pro Bono Service, 19 LrrsG. 3, 4 (1992) [hereinafter Trial Balloon].
42. The first time the Supreme Court of Florida was asked to consider a mandatory pro
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bility that the current voluntary system will fail to produce the results
expected by its supporters. Although some may regard this prediction
as cynical, it is realistic in light of the failure of voluntary programs in
other parts of the country to bridge the gap between legal needs of the
poor and the provision of legal services.4
3
In 1981 there were about fifty voluntary pro bono programs nation-
wide;44 in 1989 this number increased to approximately 600;41 and in
the early 1990s, there were about 900 voluntary state and local bar pro
bono programs.4 Yet despite the recent surge among pro bono propo-
nents for increased volunteerism among fellow members of the bar,
legal services being delivered to the poor have not increased. Indeed,
only about one-fourth of the critical legal needs of the poor are being
met by the civil justice system .4
The present voluntary plan relies heavily on the hope that members
of the Florida Bar will experience a renewed sense of personal com-
mitment to fulfill their professional obligation; the same professional
obligation, or rather "aspiration,'"4 that existed before Rule 4-6.1.
Proponents of the voluntary plan hope that the reporting requirement
will enhance the sense of public service within the souls of Florida Bar
members,4 9 but offer no incentives or motivation for such an internal
change to occur. 0 It is simply not feasible to expect an annual report-
ing requirement - a mere peer-pressure device"t - to generate full-
fledged, selfless contributions among members of the Florida Bar who
were inactive in pro bono activities in the past.
Assuming an initial increase in volunteer efforts from the members
of the Florida Bar, the maintenance of this level of commitment over
time will require extraordinary financial expense and cooperation
bono scheme was in In Re Emergency Delivery of Legal Services to the Poor, 432 So. 2d 39 (Fla.
1983).
43. See infra notes 44-47 and accompanying text.
44. Esther F. Lardent, Mandatory Pro Bono in Civil Cases. The Wrong Answer to the
Right Question, 49 MD. L. REV. 78, 89 (1990).
45. ABA CONSORTIUM ON LEGAL SERVICES AND THE PUBLIC, Tua 1989 DIRECTORY OF PRI-
VATE BA. INVOLVEMENT PROGRAMS 179-83 (1989).
46. D'Alemberte, Trial Balloon, supra note 41, at 3.
47. CONSORTIUM ON LEGAL SERVICES AND TI E PUBLIC OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION/
COMPREHENSIVE LEGAL NEEDS STUDY at 12 (1993) [hereinafter CLN STUDY].
48. See Amendments to Rules, supra note 7, at 508; see also Hughey, supra note 13.
49. D'Alemberte, Trial Balloon, supra note 41, at 57; Hughey, supra note 13, at 7 (report-
ing that the Florida Bar hopes that the new pro bono program will build a pro bono culture
statewide).
50. But see Council Wooten, Jr. & John M. Kest, Legal Services For Those In Need: Every
Lawyer's Duty, 30 TRIAL 53, 55 (July 1994) (suggesting that the smile of a child, a heartfelt
'thank you' of a mother, or the firm handshake of a man who is a little better-off is sufficient
incentive for all attorneys to engage in pro bono).
51. Amendments to Rules, supra note 7, at 505.
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from both the court system and the legislature." Although some addi-
tional financial support will come from those who choose the $350
buy-out option, this provision is unenforceable.53 The expansive litiga-
tion that is likely to result from increased representation of the indi-
gent will raise the number of spurious claims resulting in a cluttering
of the court system . 4 This increase will place an economic burden on
the already overloaded court system that neither the Legislature, the
Florida Bar, nor private donations can fund.
The novelty and hoopla of our comprehensive voluntary program
will soon pass. The Supreme Court of Florida has unanimously di-
rected the Florida Bar to take no disciplinary action against members
failing to comply with the comprehensive pro bono plan's reporting
requirement .5  This action was in response to a lawsuit by a Florida
Bar member in federal court alleging that the current pro bono pro-
gram violates the state and federal constitutions. 56 The suit claims that
the current program is the equivalent of forced labor for a court-ap-
pointed charity, and that it subjects lawyers to public ridicule for fail-
ure to meet their professional obligation because their answers on the
dues statements are public record. 57 This lawsuit is the latest and clear-
est indication that Florida's voluntary pro bono program remains
flawed and will continue to be a divisive topic among members of the
Florida Bar.
As voluntary pro bono programs nationwide have failed to ade-
quately address and remedy the increasing legal needs of the poor,58 so
also has it been the trend for the strongest proponents of pro bono
service to become frustrated with the ineffectiveness of these volun-
tary programs, and become ardent supporters of a mandatory
scheme.5 9 Should Florida's reporting requirement be declared illegal or
52. D'Alemberte, Trial Balloon, supra note 41, at 3; Hughey, supra note 13 (reporting that
approximately $600,000 has already been budgeted for pro bono activities under the new plan).
53. Amendments to Rules, supra note 7, at 502; Hughey, supra note 13, at 6 (the program
is relying on the prediction that at least one-third of Florida's lawyers will choose the buy-out
provision).
54. Shapiro, supra note 15, at 779 (concluding that making legal services widely available to
those who cannot afford them "can only serve to increase litigation in a society far too addicted
to litigation already").
55. Gary Blankenship, In Reaction to the Pro Bono Suit Bar Told Not to Discipline Those
Who Don't Report, FLA. B. NEws at 1 (Aug. 15, 1994) (quoting a letter to Bar Executive Direc-
tor John F. Harkness, Jr. from Chief Justice Stephen H. Grimes, which stated, "[i]n order to
promote a prompt resolution of the [suit filed by Thomas Schwarz], the Court unanimously
concluded to direct The Florida Bar to take no disciplinary action against any attorneys for
failing to report their pro bono activities until such time as the lawsuit had been resolved").
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. See supra notes 44-47 and accompanying text.
59. Lardent, supra note 44, at 92.
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unconstitutional, the voluntary program currently in place will be
unenforceable. To succeed in the goal of increasing the delivery of
legal services to the poor, the proponents of such a program will most
likely propose a mandatory pro bono program applicable to all Flor-
ida Bar members. Consequently, it is only a matter of time before the
Supreme Court of Florida will once again consider a petition for man-
datory pro bono in Florida or some other means of coercing public
service. In preparation for this fate, the following sections address the
objectionable and intrusive nature of a mandatory pro bono program
in Florida.
IV. MORAL OBJECTIONS
Perhaps the most common objection to mandatory pro bono is that
it contradicts the notion of professional responsibility. 0 The signifi-
cance of a professional responsibility, as applied to the legal profes-
sion, is that a lawyer's efforts, knowledge and judgment endow her
with an element of individual choice . 6 A member of the Florida Bar
has not only earned the freedom to choose membership, but more im-
portantly, as one commentator has espoused, the right "to chart one's
course after membership is attained." 62 When a regulatory entity man-
dates public service, it deprives a lawyer of both her freedom to
choose and of the sense of self-fulfillment gained through the altruis-
tic donation of time and intellect.63 Many members of the Florida Bar
make a personal commitment to provide public service to those less
fortunate;** how an attorney fulfills that personal responsibility
should be left to her own judgment. The proponents of Florida's vol-
untary pro bono program, and those proponents of a mandatory pro-
60. See Shapiro, supra note 15, at 788 (arguing that the idea of an enforceable obligation to
provide gratuitous legal services conflicts with the professional responsibility of providing qual-
ity legal services); State ex rel. Scott v. Roper, 688 S.W.2d 757, 768 (Mo. 1985) (holding that
"[clompelled legal services is totally inconsistent with the giving of pro bono service as a matter
of professional responsibility or professional pride"); ABA MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RE-
sP NSIEILr, EC 2-16 (1992) ("The legal profession cannot remain a viable force in fulfilling its
goal in our society unless its members receive adequate compensation for services rendered, and
reasonable fees should be charged in appropriate cases to clients able to pay them.") (footnotes
omitted).
61. Shapiro, supra note 15, at 788.
62. Id.
63. See id.
64. Cf. Patricia Phillips, Financing the Right to Counsel: A View from the Private Bar, 19
Loy. L.A. L. REv. 375, 376 (1985) (concluding that almost without exception, every lawyer in
California does some work for free, in one way or another). This observation is applicable, by
analogy, to Florida lawyers.
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gram, should recognize that "[c]ompelled altruism is not much of a
virtue.' 61
The term mandatory pro bono is also criticized as an oxymoron. 66
Pro bono publico refers to service rendered for the public benefit. 67 By
mandating pro bono service, both the spirit of pro bono and the per-
sonal satisfaction it brings the individual provider disappear. Under a
mandatory scheme, the service would no longer be rendered for the
public benefit as "an act of charity inspired by a sense of profession-
alism." 68 Instead, it would be performed for the lawyer's own per-
sonal benefit in an effort to retain the right to continue practicing law
or avoid professional sanctions, much like a tariff or a tax. 69 Manda-
tory pro bono would damage the traditional meaning of professional
responsibility by coercing a lawyer to represent a client without com-
pensation merely to satisfy the lawyer's professional obligation. This
is very likely to place the client in a position where her interests are
not zealously represented by counsel. 70 Thus, the general moral con-
cern whereby lawyers are "forced to do good" through a system of
mandatory pro bono represents one of the largest obstacles facing
proponents of such a system in Florida.7
One argument which attempts to justify mandatory pro bono is that
society is entitled to free public service in exchange for providing
members of the bar with the exclusive privilege to, or monopoly of the
practice of law. 72 One of the most disturbing aspects of this argument
is the suggestion that one profession is somehow more honorable than
others: a notion of elitism. 73 This is incompatible with our American
concepts of democracy, liberty, and equal rights. 74
The monopoly argument is further weakened by the simple fact that
close to 800,000 registered attorneys in the United States are compet-
ing for clients through sophisticated advertising and marketing meth-
ods.75 Florida is no exception, with approximately 52,000 attorneys
65. Shapiro, supra note 15, at 788.
66. Roger C. Cramton, Mandatory Pro Bono, 19 HoFsTRA L. REv. 1113, 1132-33 (1991)
(pointing out that the concept of mandatory pro bono is an oxymoron, much like military mu-
sic); Lardent, supra note 44, at 79 (equating the term mandatory pro bono with oxymorons such
as "jumbo shrimp" or "military intelligence").
67. Literally translated, pro bono publico means "for the public good." BLACK's LAw Dic-
TIONARY 1203 (6th ed. 1990).
68. Watkins, supra note 3, at 205.
69. But see Cramton, supra note 66, at 1132 n.105.
70. James N. Adler, et al., Pro Bono Legal Services. The Objections and Alternatives to
Mandatory Programs, 53 CAL, ST. B. J. 24, 25 (Jan./Feb. 1978); State ex rel Scott v. Roper, 688
S.W.2d 757, 768 (Mo. 1985) ("The quality of the uncompensated service can be expected to
decrease in almost direct proportion to the loss of choice of the professional rendering the serv-
ice."). For a more extensive discussion on the reluctant advocate dilemma, see infra Part V.
71. Bretz, supra note 3, at 635.
72. Smith, supra note 3, at 733; Lardent, supra note 44, at 87.
73. See Shapiro, supra note 15, at 762; Cramton, supra note 66, at 1134. For example, a
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licensed to practice in the state. 76 Furthermore, no individual is denied
the right to argue his own case," and the growth of small claims
courts and accessibility to self-help books and manuals have all com-
bined to essentially demonopolize the legal industry.
78
In addressing the problems of access to the civil justice system faced
by indigent persons, it must be recognized that this is a societal prob-
lem which, because of its magnitude, cannot be solved by the legal
profession alone.7 9 The latest ABA study shows that "[n]early three
fourths of the legal needs of low-income households ... were not
taken to the civil justice system in 1992."580 Further, nearly half of the
low-income households surveyed had at least one critical legal need
that went unattended, and some had as much as five in the previous
year.8 ' This staggering rate lends itself to only one logical conclusion:
lawyers alone cannot significantly increase access to the civil justice
system to the poor. This seemingly obvious fact is consistently, and
perhaps intentionally, overlooked by those advocating mandatory pro
bono.13
monopoly argument is not applied to farmers or grocers who can afford to give away food to the
hungry but do not, nor to doctors who can afford to donate their medical services to the sick,
but do not.
74. Shapiro, supra note 15, at 762.
75. Schimenti, supra note 39, at 677; See e.g. Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350,
384 (1978) (the state bar could not prohibit attorney from truthfully advertising routine legal
services); Shapero v. Kentucky State Bar Ass'n, 486 U.S. 466 (1988) (lawyers could not be barred
from sending truthful and nondeceptive letters to potential clients); In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412
(1977) (non-profit legal organizations are not prohibited from direct mail client solicitation for
political purposes only).
76. Division of Membership Records for The Florida Bar (this figure is calculated as of
Aug. 1, 1994).
77. State ex rel Scott v. Roper, 688 S.W.2d 757, 765 (Mo. 1985); Helen B. Kim, Legal
Education for the Pro Se Litigant. A Step Towards a Meaningful Right To Be Heard, 96 YAME
L. REv. 1641 (1987) (arguing that indigent civil litigants who cannot afford to hire counsel can
proceed pro se with adequate instruction).
78. Shapiro, supra note 15, at 776; Schimenti, supra note 39, at 677-78. See also Cramton,
supra note 66, at 1135-36 ("[Ilt is no longer accurate to speak in terms of a professional monop-
oly. Growth in the number of lawyers, the abandonment of restraints against internal competi-
tion ... and changes in legal culture have reduced or eliminated opportunities for cross-
subsidization.").
79. Phillips, supra note 64, at 380; Jeannie Costello, Who Has the Ear of the King? The
Crisis in Legal Services, 35 N.Y.L. SCH. L. Rv. 655, 679 (1990).
80. CLN STuDY, supra note 47, at 12.
81. Id. at 3-4.
82. See supra notes 44-47 and accompanying text (concluding that the legal needs of the
poor remain unmet regardless of the massive increase in voluntary pro bono organizations
around the country).
83. Smith, supra note 3 (advocating a program of mandatory pro bono in Florida). Smith
fails to reference the statistics, however, which reveal that even a system of mandated legal serv-
ices will not be sufficient to meet the poor's legal needs. See also Stephen Maher, No Bono: The
Efforts of the Supreme Court of Florida to Promote the Full A vailability of Legal Services, 41
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The problems occurring in the distribution of legal services to the
indigent comprises only one facet of our much larger societal prob-
lem: poverty.14 It follows that the answer to a social problem is a so-
cial solution. 5 To that end, some have advanced arguments for a
"mixed system" of private attorneys providing services to the indigent
at a reduced fee.8 The total cost for legal services rendered under such
a scheme would not be paid by the actual clients, but rather through
public funds. Although some complications are conceivable under
such a program,"7 the public (who ultimately benefits from the availa-
bility of gratuitous legal services) would bear at least a portion of the
burden. 8 The advocate's compensation, even if a fraction of the usual
fee received, would still act as an incentive. The mere presence of such
an incentive would surely produce a more willing, motivated and ef-
fective counsel.8 9
As Florida faces another rule amendment petition, 9° it is important
to recognize the magnitude of the problem concerning the poor's ac-
cess to the civil justice system. 91 It is so great that even if every Florida
attorney were to satisfy a twenty hour mandatory pro bono service
requirement, the demand for legal representation by Florida's indigent
would still exceed supply.9 An organized social effort is necessary to
solve the problem of access by the poor to the civil justice system.
This includes the need for support from the Legislature and increased
U. MtAmi L. REv. 973, 993 (1987). While Maher argues that the professional obligation to pro-
vide legal services in Florida must be better enforced, he fails to address how an increase in the
delivery of legal services will realistically alter the poor's access to the civil justice system.
84. John A. Humbach, Serving the Public Interest: An Overstated Objective, 65 A.B.A. J.
564, 565 (Apr. 1979).
85. Schimenti, supra note 39, at 679.
86. Id. at 690-91 (arguing for a voluntary pro bono program which combines use of public
funding to compensate attorneys for pro bono work with a renewed commitment from attor-
neys); Adler et al., supra note 70, at 24 (suggesting a mixed system of public funding and private
bar participation as a means of increasing equal access to justice); Jay L. Lichtman, Structured
Alternatives to Random Court Appointments, L.A. DAiry J., Jan. 29, 1985, at 4 (proposing that
a mixed system would more fairly and adequately allocate the burden among the public sector
and private bar, thereby offering the most effective representation to the poor).
87. Schimenti, supra note 39, at 691 (suggesting that a mixed system could encounter some
problems when the Legislature authorizes funding for attorneys participating in pro bono pro-
grams, but fails to provide such funding).
88. Id. at 690.
89. Id. at 691; see also Alice Hughey, Current Trends in Pro Bono Reporting, 1993 ABA
CENTR FOR PRO BONO ExcmOAtE 7 (reporting that Kentucky's voluntary pro bono program
allows for legal services to indigent at a reduced fee).
90. See supra Part III (arguing that a second petition for mandatory pro bono is imminent).
91. See supra notes 44-47 and accompanying text.
92. CLN STUDy, supra note 47, at 23 ("Approximately half of low- and moderate-income
American households are facing one or more situations that could be addressed by the system of
civil justice."); see also Schimenti, supra note 39, at 679; Humbach, supra note 81, at 565.
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financial backing by Florida's taxpayers-not merely a unilateral ef-
fort by the private bar. 93
V. FUNCTIONAL OBJECTIONS
Beyond the philosophical and moral complexities of a system of
mandatory pro bono, such a program has numerous functional afflic-
tions. The most distasteful of these is what this author characterizes as
the reluctant advocate dilemma. This situation results from coercing
an attorney into representing an indigent defendant without compen-
sation or under the threat of professional sanctions. Placed in this po-
sition, the lawyer, inconvenienced or otherwise unhappy donating
legal services, may not represent an indigent client as zealously as she
would represent paying clients.9 Thus, it is plausible that a direct rela-
tionship exists between decreasing quality of the service and increasing
loss of professional choice. 9 The need for equal access to justice for
the poor can only be met with legal services from lawyers who will
handle their cases seriously" and remain true to the ethical considera-
tions of the legal profession.
97
More disturbing is the possibility that mandatory pro bono will re-
sult in attorneys acting ineffectively due to their inexperience in the
particular area of the law. This occurs when securities, bankruptcy,
and intellectual property attorneys are turned loose on the poor. 98 Su-
preme Court Justice Sandra Day O'Connor referred to this arrange-
93. Phillips, supra note 64, at 380. See, e.g., Madden v. Township of Delran, 601 A.2d 211,
212 (N.J. 1992) (holding that adequate representation of the poor is "clearly an obligation of the
public"); State v. Green, 470 S.W.2d 571, 573 (Mo. 1971) (concluding that the poor's access to
the civil representation is constitutionally a burden of the state); State v. Rush, 217 A.2d 411,
448 (N.J. 1966) (maintaining that "the burden is more than the [legal] profession alone should
shoulder, and hence we are compelled to relieve the profession of it").
94. Watkins, supra note 3, at 198.
95. State ex rel Scott v. Roper, 688 S.W.2d 757, 768 (Mo. 1985).
96. Humbach, supra note 84, at 566 (suggesting that the poor should receive "more than
the diminished enthusiasm of forced labor or the seat-of-the pants guesswork of high-minded
poverty law dilettantes").
97. EC 5-2 of TiHE MODEL CODE OT' PgossIoNAL REsPoNsmLrrY (1980), provides that "[a]
lawyer should not accept proffered employment if his personal interests or desires will, or there
is a reasonable probability that they will, affect adversely the advice to be given or services to be
rendered the prospective client."; see also United States v. Anonymous, 215 F. Supp. 11, 113
(E.D. Tenn. 1963) (holding that "[a]ttorneys must not allow their private interests to conflict
with those of their clients . . . They owe their entire devotion to the interests of their clients").
98. Humbach, supra note 84, at 566. Professor Humbach argues that the legal problems of
the poor are not always simple, and mastery of the various areas of poverty law cannot be
achieved by practicing it for only few weeks each year. Bretz, supra note 3, at 634 (suggesting
that because many attorneys in firms and corporations have had minimal, if any, exposure to
poverty law, the likelihood of ineffective assistance of counsel is greater).
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ment as "a recipe for malpractice.' '99 Indeed, the costly consequences
of a possible class action legal malpractice suit against numerous
members of the Florida Bar who cannot afford, or otherwise do not
have, malpractice insurance should be enough of a disincentive to turn
most attorneys away from the idea of mandatory pro bono. The argu-
ment that attorneys compelled to perform public service can easily
learn how to serve the poor is met with the suggestion that the time
and effort expended by attorneys to educate other attorneys on the
numerous, and sometimes complicated, aspects of poverty law may be
more efficiently used by those already familiar with it. 100
Requiring attorneys to perform uncompensated legal services may
also harm the attorney/client relationship. Many indigent clients, who
may know that an attorney is not compensated for services, will likely
approach counsel with some preconceived concerns.' 0' This may result
in a lack of the trust necessary for effective representation. A client in
this circumstance may be unwilling to divulge essential information
crucial to the outcome of her case. 0 2
Another inherently unfair aspect of mandatory pro bono is the dis-
proportionate impact on various members of the Florida Bar. One of
the most ardent supporters of Florida's mandatory pro bono program
once said that "[n]o standard of pro bono obligation should exoner-
ate some lawyers from free public service while requiring it of oth-
ers." 03 This statement is in direct conflict with the provisions in Rule
4-6.1 permitting the $350 buy-out, the exception for government law-
yers and judges, and the law firm collective discharge. If mandatory
pro bono is warranted, an attorney should not be permitted to simply
"buy out" of the obligation to provide legal services to the poor.' °4
Nor should this obligation be transferable or collectively satisfied. 05 If
99. Slobodin, supra note 38, at 13 (quoting Justice Sandra Day O'Connor in an August
1991, speech at the American Bar Association's annual meeting).
100. Bretz, supra note 3, at 634 (suggesting that it would not be as efficient or effective to
have 1000 patent attorneys each taking a two-hour course on child custody as it would be to have
one attorney attend 100 hours of child custody courses and spend 1900 hours on actual cases).
101. Stevens, supra note 3, at 776.
102. Id. at 773.
103. Smith, supra note 3, at 730.
104. E.g. Amendments to Rules, supra note 7, at 506. Chief Justice Barkett specially con-
curred in Amendments to Rules, asserting that "there is an inherent inequity" with the $350
buy-out provision as it relates to Florida's current voluntary scheme. Id. at 507. Justice Kogan
was also very troubled with the buy-out provision, calling it "ethically repugnant." Id.
105. Lardent, supra note 44, at 82 (explaining that the government lawyer exception would
allow those attorneys who work full time for the poor to bypass their obligation); see also Steven
Wechsler, Attorneys' Attitudes Toward Mandatory Pro Bono, 41 SYRACUSE L. Rav. 909, 953
(1990) (arguing that government lawyers and judges should not be exempted from serving, at
PRO BONO
pro bono is an individual responsibility, any of these exceptions would
violate the most basic principles of equity and professionalism. Ironi-
cally, the hypothetical goal of any organized pro bono program is to
restore equality. '06
Even without such exceptions, the impact of the requirement would
be more burdensome on small firm lawyers and solo practitioners
than on members of large firms."°" Whereas members of small firms
and sole practitioners make their living by selling their own time, part-
ners in large firms can simply hire additional associates and assign
them to perform full-time pro bono projects. 08 A mandatory mini-
mum hourly pro bono requirement essentially presents a dilemma for
small firms and sole practitioners, the choice being to devote less time
to paying clients or devote less time to personal leisure. 109 Realizing
this, it is little wonder that it is the large firm partners who support
increased participation in pro bono programs and increased regula-
tion.11 0
The Comprehensive Legal Needs Study, performed last year
through a grant from the ABA's Consortium on Legal Services and
the Public, revealed that fifty percent of the low-income individuals
surveyed were aware of the availability of both free legal services and
lawyer referral services."' The study also found that the further below
the poverty line a household fell, the more likely the members of that
household to know they were eligible for free or reduced legal serv-
ices."12 Regardless of their awareness of eligibility, however, nearly
three-fourths of the low-income individuals surveyed in the study did
least in a minimal degree); Humbach, supra note 84, at 566 (arguing that the firm collective
provision has been characterized as a painless escape hatch for the highest paid members of our
profession).
106. See generally D'Alemberte, Trial Balloon, supra note 41, at 58 ("I urge every American
lawyer to take up the challenge of ensuring access to justice and to participate in pro bono
programs.").
107. Wechsler, supra note 105, at 952-53; Humbach, supra note 84, at 566.
108. Humbach, supra note 84, at 566 (noting that big firms buy their legal services wholesale
and sell their services at retail).
109. Id. at 566; Phillips, supra note 64, at 379.
110. Talbot "Sandy" D'Alemberte, former president of The American Bar Association and
a leader in the effort for a more organized pro bono program in Florida, recently left the posi-
tion of managing partner in the firm of Steel, Hector & Davis of Miami, Florida to become
President of Florida State University. Chesterfield Smith, a strong supporter of the mandatory
program in Florida, is a senior partner with the law firm of Holland & Knight. Finally, both
Council Wooten, Jr. and John M. Kest, who recently co-authored an article on every lawyer's
duty to provide gratuitous legal services, are founding partners of the Orlando based firm of
Wooten, Honeywell & Kest. See Wooten & Kest, supra note 50.
11l. CLN STUDY, supra note 47, at 22.
112. Seeid. at23.
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not take their legal needs to the civil justice system during the previous
year.' The survey showed that of those low-income individuals who
had a previous experience with the civil justice system, sixty-two per
cent were either dissatisfied or indifferent about the results. 14 These
statistics suggest that the poor prefer to invest their time and efforts
on something other than securing adequate legal assistance. 'I
As discussed earlier, access to legal services is only one portion of
the greater problem of poverty. The poor also suffer from having in-
adequate shelter, an insufficient supply of food, a lack of medical as-
sistance, and low-quality clothing." 6 With all of these deficiencies, it
is not clear that an expanded supply of legal services is a priority.
Realistically, a low-income individual given a choice between $1000 in
cash or twenty billable hours by a partner in a Miami law firm (ap-
proximated at $5000) would most likely select the former. This choice
would translate into the ability to purchase goods and services truly
needed by the indigent individual."7
Contrary to the select justifications of Florida's proponents of or-
ganized voluntary and mandatory pro bono programs, a large increase
in the delivery of legal services to the poor is more likely to hurt than
help those in the low income bracket." 8 When lawyers are required to
perform a mandatory minimum number of pro bono service hours,
they will sometimes be forced to find matters to litigate for indigent
clients, regardless of the merits. "9 The immediate result of this in-
creased amount of litigation means more billable hours to the lawyers
of landlords and debt collectors.'2° The increased cost for these busi-
nesses will then certainly be passed onto the poor and middle class
consumers in terms of higher priced or decreased supply of housing
and credit.' 2' In sum, although the immediate result from the pro
113. Id. at 12.
114. See id. at 17 (chart 8).
115. See Jonathan Macey, Mandatory Pro Bono: Comfort for the Poor or Welfare for the
Rich?, 77 CORmELa L. REV. 1115, 1117 (1992); Humbach, supra note 84, at 565.
116. Humbach, supra note 84, at 565.
117. Id.; Macey, supra note 115, at 1116. Professor Macey further suggests that even when
all of the poor's highest priorities are met, they may still wish to allocate their resources in ways
other than hiring a lawyer, such as buying an automobile or paying for a college education.
118. Bradley A. Smith, The Limits of Compulsory Professionalism: How the Unified Bar
Harms the Legal Profession, 22 FiA. ST. U. L. REv. 36, 53 (1994) (Professor Smith suggests
many members of the bar would argue strongly that an increase in the availability of legal serv-
ices "would encourage marginal or frivolous suits by tenants and thus raise the overall cost of
housing to poor people.")
119. Macey, supra note 115, at 1118. Professor Macey argues that because in pro bono liti-
gation the cost of representation is zero to the client, clients will pursue litigation that produces
little or no benefit.
120. Humbach, supra note 84, at 566.
121. Id.
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bono representation may be satisfactory to both the client and the ad-
vocate, the long-term effect of the representation may prove to be ec-
onomically damaging to the indigent client.
Narrowing the definition of pro bono services to encompass only
those individuals who are below the poverty line presents yet another
significant drawback.' Lawyers who once donated their time or legal
services to moderate-income individuals, family members, church,
school or community groups, and other various charities, will be
forced under Florida's voluntary program-and more so under a
mandatory scheme-to divert their efforts solely to the cause of the
poor or those activities targeted at predominantly addressing the needs
of the poor. 23 The irony behind this result is evident, as any attempt
by proponents of a mandatory program to increase access to the poor
of the civil justice system may actually result in the reduction of the
total amount of gratuitous legal services attorneys already perform on
their own initiative. 124 This conclusion reveals deeper concerns regard-
ing the effect on individual freedom and expression that occurs any
time an attorney is compelled by the state to engage in activities which
the state deems worthwhile. 21
One must wonder why it is that those who most vehemently peti-
tioned the Supreme Court of Florida to adopt a program of organized
voluntary pro bono, and undoubtedly those who may soon petition
the court for a mandatory system, are the members of elite groups
within the legal community. 12 The answer to this question is two-fold.
First, this renewed sense of public service to the poor by those at the
top of the legal ladder has been seen by many as merely "a public
relations gimmick, designed to deflect the suspicion that lawyers are
basically a bulwark between justice and the elite." 127 However, the ini-
122. FLA. BAR R. PROF. CONDUCT 4-6.1(a). The current Florida pro bono scheme states that
"[elach member of The Florida Bar in good standing, as part of that member's professional
responsibility, should (1) render pro bono legal services to the poor or (2) participate, to the
extent possible, in other pro bono service activities that directly relate to the legal needs of the
poor." Id. (emphasis added).
123. Cramton, supra note 66, at 1129.
124. See id.; see also Phillips, supra note 64, at 376; Schimenti, supra note 39, at 689 (argu-
ing that limiting a mandatory pro bono program to the needs of the poor may have a "chilling
effect" on other voluntary programs).
125. Cramton, supra note 66, at 1131-32. Smith, supra note 118 (Professor Smith argues that
bar members who oppose the private bar's stand on legal services for the poor may actually be
forced to support such activities through payment of bar dues.) These concerns could serve as a
starting point for a First Amendment discussion, but as noted earlier, the constitutional aspects
of uncompensated legal services are beyond the scope of this Comment. For an in-depth discus-
sion of First Amendment objections, as well as other constitutional problems with mandatory
pro bono see Shapiro, supra note 15, at 762-77.
126. See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
127. Humbach, supra note 84, at 566.
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tial attempts to raise Floridians' perception of lawyers may have al-
ready drastically backfired on the most enthusiastic advocates of
increased legal services for the poor. Floridians can read in the papers
or hear in the news about the heated debate and opposition within the
organized bar concerning mandatory or even organized voluntary pro
bono programs.'28 The master plan to raise the social perception of
attorneys, it seems, has only further perpetuated the public image of
lawyers as avaricious and heartless individuals.
A second argument as to why Florida's voluntary pro bono pro-
gram was so strongly promoted by those who are members of Flori-
da's legal elite is premised on the question of who really benefits from
increased access by the poor to the civil justice system-cui bono?129
The answer is not, sadly enough, the poor. Rather, it is often the same
individuals who ardently petitioned for a more stringent pro bono
program. 130
To meet pro bono service requirements, private attorneys will, at
times, have no choice but to bring suits for little or no practical
value. '3 The defendants to these suits will have no choice but to hire
lawyers to defend against these suits.'32 Thus, increased civil litigation
by the poor could translate into a windfall for the big firms who rep-
resent the landlords and creditors of the indigent consumer. 31 Using
as a model the structure of Florida's current comprehensive pro bono
program, a similarly defined mandatory program in Florida would af-
ford partners of large firms the opportunity to safely and cheaply
train new associates using complex pro bono cases." 4 At the same
time, the entire firm would collectively meet its pro bono obligation
by requiring young and eager associates to litigate these pro bono
matters. Finally, the firm's business is likely to boom as new clients
such as landlords, debt collectors or corporate entities wait in the
lobby for a defense lawyer. The entire arrangement is a "can't lose"
situation for the big firm, but not so clearly beneficial for the indigent
client.
128. See supra notes 2, 13, 55-56 and accompanying notes.
129. Humbach, supra note 84, at 566. Literally translated, "Cui bono?" means "who prof-
its (or has profited) by it?" THE OXFORD ENcUSH DICMIONARY 112 (2d ed. 1989).
130. Macey, supra note 115, at 1119; see also In re Amendments I, supra note 4, at 801 n.l
(listing the names of the individuals who joined the petition to change the Rules Regulating The
Florida Bar dealing with public service).
131. Macey, supranote ll5, at 1118.
132. Humbach, supra note 84, at 566 ("[W]henever clients who cannot pay get more legal
services, clients who can pay need more legal services. This results in new business for the
bar.").
133. Id.; see also supra note 118 and accompanying text.
134. Id.
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When the proponents of increased delivery of legal services to the
poor set out on their quest to provide increased services for the poor,
they failed to take into account the complexity of the problem at
hand.3 ' They also erroneously assumed that an increase in legal serv-
ices is the most appropriate remedy for the problem at hand.136 Inade-
quate access to the civil justice system is, however, only one of a
broad spectrum of deficiencies the indigent class contends with on a
daily basis. 37 Rather than take a more encompassing approach, they
devised a plan to minimize the large gap between the poor and the
courts solely through the hope of increased lawyer participation.'
Based upon these observations, it is probable that a program of man-
datory pro bono, or even Florida's current voluntary pro bono sys-
tem, will accomplish only an inflation of society's unjustified
dependence on lawyers. 3 9
VI. ADMINISTRATIVE DIFFICULTIES
A mandatory pro bono program in Florida will also face significant
administrative obstacles.' 40 The coordination of prospective clients
with their respective counsel and monitoring of member compliance
with the mandatory scheme will inevitably require increased staffing.
This will be funded either through increased bar dues, or spending
cuts resulting in reductions in any number of bar-sponsored pro-
grams.'4 ' This is yet another barrier to the success of a mandatory
135. Marc Galanter, The Duty Not to Deliver Legal Services, 30 U. MIAMi L. REv. 929, 932
(1976) (Professor Galanter argues that solving the problem of the poor's access to law is not as
simple as providing more legal services; instead, it requires us to examine "a more complex field
in which there are many possible sets of needs which might be served by a variety of alternative
paths to the benefits of legality").
136. Id. at 944 ("We need to guard against automatically assuming that providing lawyers'
services is the most appropriate way to solve the problem.").
137. See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
138. Phillips, supra note 64, at 380 (noting that proponents of pro bono overlooked the fact
that "the obligation to provide the wherewithal to meet [the legal needs of the poor] is not
exclusively that of lawyers").
139. Adler et al., supra note 70, at 30; Macey, supra note 115, at 1123 ("[b]y requiring
lawyers to subsidize litigation that society would not otherwise support, the legal profession will
confirm suspicions that our society is too litigious and that lawyers take themselves way, way too
seriously."); Shapiro, supra note 15, at 779 (a mandatory pro bono program "can only serve to
increase litigation in a society far too addicted to litigation already"); Galanter, supra note 135,
at 944 ("lawyers are an expensive way to solve the problem [of the poor's access to the civil
justice system], and one that carries the not inconsiderable danger of promoting dependence on
professionals.").
140. Adler et al., supra note 70, at 27.
141. Telephone Interview with Mike Tartaglia, Programs Division Director for The Florida
Bar (June 27, 1994). Mr. Tartaglia said that although the Bar's pro bono program has not re-
quired any additional staff or funding to administer, were Florida to move to a mandatory pro
bono scheme, more staff and more funds would be required.
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scheme. 42 Finally, enforcement efforts under a mandatory system will
deplete remaining funds and staff devoted to other purposes. 143
Although the voluntary program in Florida has not required any
additional staff or funding in its administration, a non-voluntary bar
association which mandates service for its members would require
more complicated methods of monitoring member compliance. The
burden of tracking total member hours, especially in light of "buy-
out" or carryover provisions,'" is far more difficult than the simple
task of determining whether a member correctly filled out the lower
right hand corner of a dues statement form in compliance with the
current reporting requirement.
Administering a system where needy clients are coordinated with
prospective bar members will also present a complex task.' 4 It is
doubtful whether even the present client referral system in Florida,
which uses local circuit pro bono committees, 146would be an effective
method for coordinating client services under a mandatory pro-
gram. 47 Burdening local legal services agencies with the task of direct-
ing clients to available attorneys under the mandatory program would
certainly detract from time they could otherwise spend on their own
caseload. '48 If the Florida Bar is chosen to coordinate client referrals
for its 52,000 members under a mandatory plan, the bar would be
forced to create an entirely new division dedicated solely to client re-
ferral services. The costs involved in monitoring compliance and im-
plementing a statewide client referral system make it apparent that a
mandatory pro bono program will require a significant increase in
Florida Bar revenues. 49 This increase can only come about through a
substantial increase in membership dues.
A mandatory pro bono system will generate more legal representa-
tion for the indigent in Florida. However, there are already massive
142. Shapiro, supra note 15, at 779, 785.
143. Adler et al., supra note 70, at 27 (observing that "difficulties inhere in both the admin-
istration and enforcement of a mandatory pro bono program" and that an enforcing agency
would face "insurmountable problems in judging whether services rendered in fact qualify as
pro bono services"); see also Bretz, supra note 3, at 634.
144. Under Florida's voluntary pro bono program, bar members are given credit for up to
two succeeding years in the event they complete more than 20 hours of pro bono service to the
poor in a single year. FLA. BAR R. PROF. CONDUCT 4-6.1(e).
145. See Bretz, supra note 3, at 633.
146. FLA. BAR R. PROF. CONDUCT 4-6.1(c).
147. It is unrealistic to expect the local pro bono committees to perform their everyday jobs
and jointly coordinate clients with the thousands of attorneys needing to fulfill their mandatory
service hours.
148. Bretz, supra note 3, at 633.
149. Id. (arguing that bar administration of a pro bono system would require a large increase
in the association's budget).
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case loads at each court level throughout Florida. There may be insuf-
ficient increases in the number of judges, clerks, and administrative
staff to handle the new filings and judicial proceedings resulting from
a mandatory pro bono requirement. The likely result of such an over-
burdened judicial staff, struggling to adhere to its dockets and hearing
schedules, is that less than full attention will be given to cases that are
constitutionally entitled to equal and complete judicial review. In
sum, a mandatory pro bono program, as one commentator has noted,
"can only serve to increase litigation in a society far too addicted to
litigation already." 50
Equal and consistent enforcement of a mandatory pro bono system
in Florida through the use of professional, disciplinary, or criminal
penalties is unrealistic not only because of its administrative woes, but
also because of its draconian nature. Even one of the most ardent sup-
porters of mandatory pro bono in Florida agreed that enforcement of
a mandatory scheme would present a major problem.' The commit-
tee which would be required to regulate accurate reporting, oversee
members suspected of inaccurate reporting, and prosecute violators
can be equated with the Internal Revenue Service." 2 In every respect,
the right to practice law in Florida under a mandatory program would
be conditioned upon payment of a member's yearly "tax," i.e., the
minimum hours of public service or its monetary equivalent.
The disciplinary or enforcement committee would be placed in a
difficult corner if a large number of bar members chose not to pay the
"tax." If the bar failed to consistently punish the conscientious objec-
tors, general non-compliance would be likely.' Thus, lawyers who
are not generally inclined to do pro bono work would choose not to
fulfill their service obligation, while those who normally perform pro
bono work on their own initiative would be "turned-off" by the man-
datory nature of an act that should come from within.5 4 On the other
hand, if the committee zealously proceeded against all violators, the
resources allocated for other departments within the committee and
within the Bar as a whole would be substantially drained. More dam-
aging still, a sense of general resentment and distrust toward the bar
150. Shapiro, supra note 15, at 779.
151. Smith, supra note 3, at 728 (explaining that the difficulties, including staff and expendi-
ture, involved in verifying the actual number of service hours recorded and those actually per-
formed will present an obstacle to the administration of a mandatory pro bono program).
152. Shapiro, supra note 15, at 783-84 (asserting that a mandatory service obligation is the
equivalent "of a special tax on lawyers, to be paid either in services or their financial equiva-
lent").
153. Cramton, supra note 66, at 1128.
154. Bretz, supra note 3, at 634.
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among Florida lawyers would surely emerge. At best, this could lead
to fewer donations by members to numerous programs of the Florida
Bar. At worst, this could lead to Florida lawyers choosing to practice
out of state.
The rule of probability indicates that an increase in the amount of
litigation translates into a higher likelihood for legal malpractice
claims.' Although many of the larger law firms provide their mem-
bers with malpractice insurance, solo practitioners and members of
smaller firms may not be as fortunate. Retaining malpractice insur-
ance is not a requirement to practice law in Florida and it is a substan-
tial expense, so many attorneys choose to go without it. When these
uninsured attorneys are required to perform pro bono legal services,
the experience may not only be economically disadvantageous, 5 6 but
also may constitute a potential risk they would rather not assume.157
As indicated above, the additional funding that would be required
to finance the numerous programs necessary for the implementation
and operation of a mandatory pro bono program in Florida would
likely result in increased bar dues. This may prove detrimental to the
best interests of the indigent class in the long run as increased Bar
dues would mean higher legal fees for merchants and creditors in turn
increasing the costs of their goods and services. The corporate client
would certainly pass on its business costs, including attorney's fees, to
the consumer. This increase in the cost of living would place the ac-
quisition of legal services further down on the poor's priority list. Al-
though this is an oversimplified economic model, it demonstrates once
more that a radical increase in delivery of legal services for the poor
would not, by itself, substantially improve the poor's access to the
civil justice system.
VII. REALISTIC ALTERNATIVES TO MANDATORY PRO BONO
As stressed throughout this Comment, a mandatory pro bono pro-
gram, even with the benefit of full Bar member compliance, will not
meet the growing legal needs of the poor. 5 ' A key to solving the prob-
lems obstructing the poor's access to civil redress may be to provide
155. Assuming a malpractice probability of five cases per 100 cases, every 1000 cases of pro
bono service would result in 50 malpractice claims. See also supra notes 98-100 and accompany-
ing text.
156. See supra notes 109-110 and accompanying text.
157. See supra notes 98-100 and accompanying text.
158. Schimenti, supra note 39, at 644.
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alternatives requiring less lawyering while simultaneously producing
adequate and fair dispute resolution. 5 9
The first step would be to make mediation and other forms of alter-
native dispute resolution a realistic and accessible alternative for the
poor. 16° Properly informed, the poor may be more likely to take part
in proceedings that are compromise-seeking in nature, rather than
those that are adversarial. 6' It is precisely the perceived threat of a
devastating and embarrassing day in court that turns many away from
pursuing civil remedies. One solution to this problem is to provide the
poor with the information and the forum to engage in alternative dis-
pute resolution. The information can be easily provided at local legal
aid offices by attorneys or non-attorneys sufficiently familiar with
small-claims mediation. The actual mediation sessions could also be
coordinated by non-attorneys, be held in the legal services offices, and
conducted entirely by local business persons.
Of course, the success rate of compromise-seeking methods can
only be measured by the willingness of their participants. For that rea-
son, an effective advertising campaign should accompany such a pro-
gram. 62 The funding for both the advertising campaign and the
indigent mediation program itself could be derived from a portion of
the funds allotted to the legal aid clinics by the state, the federal gov-
ernment, and through donations from the private bar.
The various forms of alternative dispute resolution cannot, how-
ever, be expected to resolve all of the legal dilemmas of the poor. 63
Another key alternative may be the education of indigent litigants on
how to proceed pro se.16 The CLN Study showed that forty-one per-
cent of the low-income population surveyed chose to handle legal
problems on their own initiative.' 5 Since many within the low-income
bracket feel that they cannot afford to hire an attorney'66 or the wait-
159. Adler et al., supra note 70, at 30; see also Hughey, supra note 89 (reporting that al-
though the Texas voluntary pro bono system focuses on increased delivery of legal services to the
poor, it also emphasizes a simplification of the legal process altogether).
160. Danzig & Lowi, Disputes and Mediation in the United States: A Reply to Professor
Felstiner, 9 LAw & Soc'v Rav. 675 (1975).
161. Galanter, supra note 135, at 934.
162. The CLN STuDy revealed that only 18 of the low-income individuals surveyed knew
about mediation. CLN STUDy, supra note 47, at 22.
163. Matters such as drafting wills, simple contracts, or documents for uncontested divorces
are more readily addressed through other means.
164. Kim, supra note 77, at 1643 (proposing that attorneys or paralegals can educate pro se
litigants by means of classroom instruction).
165. CLN STY, supra note 47, at 11.
166. Id. at 15-16 (approximately 16% of those surveyed gave as a reason for not seeking civil
redress that they could not afford an attorney).
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ing time before a local legal aid clinic is able to handle their case,
education on how to proceed pro se may be their best alternative.
Ideally, legal education for pro se litigants would be most effective
if each classroom session were limited to a single legal process: wills,
contracts, divorces, evictions. 67 Most importantly, however, class-
room instruction would afford pro se litigants the chance to ask ques-
tions particular to their situation.,68 These classes could be taught by
paralegals, law students, or other non-legal staff.
One possible difficulty with this arrangement is a violation of the
unauthorized practice of law restrictions; 69 that is restricting the non-
lawyer instructor's answers to only general explanations of the law,
without necessarily rendering a legal opinion. 70 One solution is to
provide a licensed attorney who could answer the fact-specific ques-
tions by participants at the end of the instructional capsule presented
by the non-lawyer. 7' As with an accessible program of alternative dis-
pute resolution, a successful program of classroom legal instruction
for the indigent pro se litigant would fulfill a significant portion of the
legal needs of the poor while at the same time allowing legal services
lawyers to devote more time and attention to their current case load.
Psychologists, parents, and teachers would all agree that the most
effective tool in shaping positive long-term behavior patterns is posi-
tive reinforcement, while the worst is punishment. '7 A mandatory pro
bono program seeks to coerce the desired behavior through a punish-
ment scheme, which may include disbarment and even criminal penal-
ties against members who choose not to comply. The disturbing
rationale behind this theory of compliance was sarcastically inter-
preted by one opponent of mandatory pro bono as burning down the
house to reduce the risk of fire.' Several commentators have rightly
suggested that rather than imposing disciplinary sanctions on attor-
neys for failing to comply with mandatory service hours, it would be
much more effective to consistently reward those attorneys who actu-
167. Kim, supra note 77, at 1651.
168. Id. at 1653 (the individualized attention one receives by being able to ask questions
cannot be replaced by reading a pamphlet handed out by a legal services clinic, or by a self-help
manual).
169. Id. at 1654.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. See Cramton, supra note 66, at 1138 (suggesting that inducements and rewards are more
efficacious in changing behavior than commands and threats of punishment).
173. Shapiro, supra note 15, at 791 (Professor Shapiro's position suggests that the goal of a
mandatory pro bono system is to provide an excess of legal services, so legal services are no
longer needed by the poor).
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ally fulfill their aspirational professional responsibility to render gra-
tuitous legal services to the poor. 7"
One alternative suggested as a means of providing positive rein-
forcement to attorneys in return for pro bono hours is to count such
hours as "billable hours," whereby law firms would consider an asso-
ciate's pro bono activities in making decisions concerning promotions,
bonuses, and eligibility for partnership. 75 With some of the larger
firms demanding 1800 to 2200 yearly billable hours from their young
associates, very little time remains to engage in pro bono activities. 6
Including pro bono hours as billable hours would substantially in-
crease volunteerism, at least within the young attorney section of the
organized bar. By allowing associates to "bill" their pro bono hours,
the partners would give these associates a meaningful choice in
whether to perform pro bono or not.' 77 This arrangement could bene-
fit the firm as well; the positive publicity and free advertising the firm
would receive for its efforts could translate into increased firm name
recognition within the community and a corresponding increase in cli-
ents.
In Florida, every member of the bar must participate in continuing
legal education (CLE), compiling at least thirty credit hours of ap-
proved CLE instruction every three years. 7 With each CLE credit
worth anywhere from twenty to fifty dollars, depending upon the lo-
cation where the course is offered, 79 the thirty required CLE hours
can cost Florida Bar members as much as $1500. As an aid in com-
pleting the thirty required CLE credit hours, Florida Bar members
should be awarded CLE vouchers or certificates in return for render-
ing gratuitous legal services. The members would, in turn, exchange
174. Watkins, supra note 3, at 193-94; Alan Sundberg, Public Interest Law: Professional
Duty and Pro Bono, 55 FLA. B.J. 502, 504 (June 1981); D'Alemberte, Trial Balloon, supra note
41, at 57 (suggesting that "lawyers should be applauded when they do accept [pro bonol serv-
ice"); see Hughey, supra note 13 (reporting that Kentucky's voluntary pro bono program en-
gages in positive reinforcement by recognizing those attorneys who perform the pro bono goal of
50 hours).
175. Watkins, supra note 3, at 194; Bretz, supra note 3, at 640; Lardent, supra note 44, at
102.
176. See Phillips, supra note 64, at 379.
177. See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
178. FLA. BAR R. PROF. CONDUCT 6-10.3(b) (1993); The Florida Bar re Amendment to Rules
Regulating The Florida Bar Chapter 6 (Legal Specialization and Education), 548 So. 2d 1120
(Fla. 1989) (authorizing and putting into effect Rule 6-10.3, entitled "Minimum Continuing Le-
gal Education Standards").
179. Telephone Interview with Michelle Lucas, Program Assistant, Legal Specialization and
Education Department of The Florida Bar (Aug. 9, 1994). Ms. Lucas stated classes run any-
where from $150 for seven credit hours to much higher fees, depending on the location of the
course.
19951
796 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW [Vol. 22:771
their vouchers for CLE credits. Is° This second alternative would be
applicable to all Florida Bar members, and represents a significant in-
centive for attorneys to increase access to the poor to the civil justice
system without the use of punitive measures.
As another alternative to mandatory pro bono legal services, Flor-
ida Bar members should be rewarded once they complete a certain
number of pro bono hours by receiving substantial deductions in bar
dues.'8 ' Currently, Florida Bar members are required to pay $190 in
annual dues.' s2 A twenty percent deduction once the member com-
pletes twenty hours and a fifty percent reduction in bar dues once the
member completes forty hours or more of service seems an appropri-
ate positive reinforcement to encourage member participation in pro
bono legal services. This new policy could be easily implemented and
monitored by the Florida Bar Membership Records Division with min-
imal added expenditure. This option would apply to members state-
wide, and illustrates yet another alternative which could be utilized to
establish long-lasting positive behavior patterns in Florida's attorneys,
in lieu of punishment.
One final alternative to imposing a system of mandatory pro bono
on the private Bar is to make public interest work more attractive to
enthusiastic young law school graduates who cannot afford to practice
public interest law because of large student debts. As a positive incen-
tive, a substantial loan forgiveness plan could be offered to those indi-
viduals who choose to apply their legal expertise in aid of the poorest
and most vulnerable members of society.8 3 The average indebtedness
of law graduates nationwide for the last academic year was $52,000.184
The average starting salary in Florida for public interest jobs is about
$23,500.85 From a purely economic standpoint, Florida's law school
graduates cannot be expected to forego the opportunity for employ-
ment in large firms in favor of public interest work. It is little wonder,
then, that only 2.51 percent of law graduates in Florida chose to be-
come public interest attorneys in 1992.186
180. Watkins, supra note 3, at 194; see also Schimenti, supra note 39, at 694 (suggesting that
continuing education programs include sessions on poverty law).
181. Sundberg, supra note 174, at 504.
182. FLA. BAR R. PROF. CONDUCT 1-7.3(a) (1993).
183. William P. Hoye, High Cost of Doing Good, 81 A.B.A. J., 96 (Jan. 1995).
184. Id.
185. Telephone Interview with Marc Taps, Senior Managing Attorney for North Florida Le-
gal Services (Jan. 17, 1995). Mr. Taps stated that starting salaries for public interest attorneys
vary throughout Florida. The average starting salary in South Florida is about $25,000, while the
average starting salary in North Florida is about $22,000.
186. NEw GRADUATES IN PUBLIC SERVICE: PROFILEs OF PEOPLE, JOBS, AND PAY/ERSSAMPLER
SERIES, CLASS OF 1992 7 (1993).
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The loan forgiveness program could be funded either through the
federal or state government, or even the private bar itself. The main
factor is that a real incentive exist to increase the level and, more im-
portantly, the quality of legal services being rendered to the indigent
client.'97 A loan forgiveness plan of the type where both the govern-
ment and the private bar contribute funds is precisely the type of mul-
tilateral effort that is required to improve the poor's access to the civil
justice system, as opposed to a system of mandatory pro bono, which
places the burden entirely on the shoulders of the private bar. 88
VIII. CONCLUSION
Florida's comprehensive voluntary pro bono plan is, at least for
now, devoid of any enforcement mechanism.8 9 The recent action by a
Florida Bar member challenging the plan is likely to focus attention
on the inherent unfairness of organized programs that attempt to co-
erce charitable services. Such a program eliminates the most essential
principle of professional responsibility: professional choice. Addition-
ally, any system where a reluctant advocate is coerced to perform un-
compensated legal services carries the high probability of mediocre
representation by counsel. Finally, the implementation and continued
operation of a mandatory pro bono plan could only be achieved
through an extraordinary increase in staffing and expense at every
level of administration.
Before concluding that a drastic increase in the amount of legal
services donated by members of the bar will meet the legal needs of
the poor, one should first recognize that even if each of the 52,000
members of the Florida Bar donated twenty hours of public service
the legal needs of the poor would still remain drastically unmet.190
Moreover, the long-term effects of such a statewide mandatory legal
services effort is more likely to impair the ability of the poor to secure
previously attainable consumer goods and services. The indigent class
is aware that they are eligible for free legal services, yet they often
choose not to take advantage of such services. Instead, the poor re-
solve many of their legal woes through a medium they readily trust-
themselves.
187. Ensuring the availability of more public interest attorneys though positive incentives
will result in a more zealous and competent advocate for the poor because public interest attor-
neys are not only more familiar with poverty law issues, but also excited about representing the
indigent client. See supra notes 94-100 and accompanying text.
188. See supra notes 90-93 and accompanying text.
189. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
190. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
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A well-structured statewide program to raise the awareness of the
poor about the numerous existing alternative dispute resolution pro-
grams, together with a system of positive incentives to Florida Bar
members who fulfill the bar's aspirational goal to render meaningful
legal representation to the poor, would be more successful than a pro-
gram that relies on hope, peer-pressure, and punishment to assure
compliance. Under the threat of forced labor inherent in any program
of coerced pro bono representation, we must seek new alternatives to
ensure that everyone has access to civil redress.
IF

